Many constituents have contacted me about the Assisted Dying Bill. I voted in favour of this Bill but the House of Commons rejected the Bill by 330 votes to 118. Please read the speech I prepared for the House of Commons.
Speech to House of Commons by Huw Merriman MP in the Assisted Dying Bill debate
(Note that the version delivered was an edited extract due to time constraints imposed by the Deputy Speaker)
In speaking in the Chamber on the Assisted Dying Bill, I hope to be able to do justice to the many letters and communications I have received from hundreds of my constituents in Bexhill and Battle and the many conversations which have ensued. I also hope to be able to articulate some of the points which constituents of standing have given to me when I sought their counsel on this matter. I am fortunate in having thoughtful clergy, clinicians, former national newspaper editors, charity officials and leading campaigners as my constituents. These wise individuals have helped me in my quest to reach a decision.
I am, as ever, indebted to all of these constituents for sharing their reasoning, concerns and hopes. Many of my correspondent constituents, both those in favour of this Bill and those against, have used moving experiences of loved ones as well as their own hopes and fears for the future. The kindness displayed by those on both ends of the spectrum has been refreshing and I thank them for taking the time to persuade me of their views in such an articulate manner.
My journey has taken the entirety of summer to complete and has only just been concluded as I wanted to factor in the many impassioned and inspirational speeches which I knew this chamber would produce, and has produced, today.
I will be voting in favour of the Assisted Dying Bill.
Having reached my decision, I wanted to set out the factors which made the merits of this Bill outweigh my concerns.
Central to my thinking is that the right to end a life under this Bill can only apply to a life which is diagnosed as expecting to end within six months. When assessing the other factors, such as what would constitute a 'voluntary, clear, settled and informed wish' and what would fall within 'capacity to make a decision' I found these to be spokes in a cog which continually came back to the point that the right to end a life could only apply to a person whose life would, in any event, end within six months regardless.
I have listened to those who have argued, with reasons I accept, that it is hard to diagnose a condition with a correct timeline. However, to deny a person this right to end their own life purely on the basis that a certain progressive condition may turn out to give slightly longer than 6 months of life does not appear proportionate, in my view.
The Bill, as well as requiring that death be expected within 6 months, requires that a doctor diagnose the terminal illness and that it cannot be reversed. In requiring a second medical opinion, I am persuaded that only those who are on the pathway towards their death will be afforded the right to end their life.
It is an essential ingredient for me that any person able to act in accordance with this Bill can, pursuant to Clause 5, be a conscientious objector without ramification. Accordingly, I would expect this to apply to the high court judge required to determine under Clause 1, the pharmacist required to dispense the medicines for the attending doctor under Clause 4 and both the attending and independent doctor. I have heard it argued that so many doctors will refuse to act that only those zealously in favour of assisted dying will act and will not be balanced in their clinical judgment. I do not accept that clinicians would readily act in this unethical manner and, if that view were to be misplaced, to do so would be an offence under Clause 10(2).
I have also heard it contended that individuals may feel a burden to their loved ones in their terminal illness and therefore act to end their life pursuant to this Bill. Per Clause 1 of the Bill, the capacity and state of mind must be certified by the high court but I do not feel it right to thereafter determine if someone is exercising their right to an assisted death due to being a burden, wishing to avoid pain, or wishing not to waste away before their loved ones and losing dignity. It is sufficient for me that the person has a terminal and irreversible illness and has arrived at their own decision. Thereafter, it is for that person to decide, after the cooling off period, if they wish to exercise their right.
I have also heard it argued that this Bill will not help those who are locked in to a coma, cannot hold the capacity to make a determination of their own or cannot administer the act of death themselves. This argument holds true and I would be unable to vote for a Bill with width to allow these additional cases due to the fact that others would have to cause the decision and death to occur. There would not be enough safeguards for my vote were that to be suggested.
As such, this Bill is limited in its applicability use and it is no surprise to me that Oregon State, with a similar law to this Bill, had only 150 exercise the right to an assisted death from a population of 4 million. I think it likely, albeit it is not a part of my reasoning, that only a similarly small proportion of those with terminal conditions will exercise the right to end their life with assistance.
I have heard it said that this Bill will be subject to a much wider interpretation by the courts than that which I have described. I do not discount this but have greater faith in both the wording of this bill, particularly over the need for the prognosis to be terminal and death to occur within six month, and the reluctance of our courts to make law where the drafting is already clear and settled. I have also heard the arguments that enacting this Bill today would make it easier for future Parliaments to amend and broaden the applicability beyond those with terminal illness and perhaps to those with mental illness. Whilst I hope this will not occur, I have grappled with the persuasive arguments that if this House opens the door and leaves it ajar then the House makes it easier to open it widely thereafter. However, if this House failed to legislate on the basis that a future House could broaden legalisation then we would never produce any new laws at all. Ultimately, I concluded that I should make my decision based on the Bill before me and not on a hypothetical draft which may never be read.
The crux of my reasoning, which ultimately allows me to outweigh the arguments and vote in favour of this Bill, is a desire to grant a right to those who may require it and will be impacted by exercising it. This right is not for those who wrote to me, often citing religious arguments, that lives should not be capable of being ended prematurely. This right is not for those who will see out their final days of a terminal illness and rely on excellent palliative care. Those people will not utilise this law. This Bill is for the smaller number of people who would wish to exercise the right to die earlier in their final six months. Before they fade away in front of their family. Before they enter a desperate period which they feel they cannot face. Before they believe that they will lose their dignity. It is for those people, with their own individual reasons, who I will cast my vote for today to allow them this choice.
Watch the speech here
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